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At the Cutting Edge of Labor
Law Preemption: A Critique of
Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer
Stephen F. Befort and Bryan N. Smith*
I. Introduction
The topic of federal labor law preemption presents one of the dens-
est thickets in all of labor and employment law. The Supreme Court,
for example, has decided more cases touching on federal preemption
than on any other legal issue in the field of collective bargaining.1 These
cases have yielded two distinct theories of labor law preemption. The
Garmon strand of preemption precludes the states from regulating con-
duct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).2 The Machinists strand, meanwhile, preempts
state law that intrudes on areas that Congress intended to leave to
the free play of economic forces. 3 These preemption theories, in turn,
are subject to a dizzying variety of exceptions.4 The resulting legal
landscape is meandering at best. As Justice Frankfurter once re-
marked, the contours of labor law preemption are "of a Delphic nature,
to be translated into concreteness [only] by the process of litigating
elucidation."
5
This need for elucidating litigation is fueled as new contexts arise
to test the reach of these two labor law preemption doctrines. Califor-
nia Assembly Bill 1889 (AB 1889), enacted by the California legisla-
ture effective in 2001, provides one such context. This new statute,
codified as sections 16645 to 16649 of the California Government Code,
*Mr. Befort is Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, & Bennett Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School. He serves as the 2003-2004 Secretary of the Labor and
Employment Law Section of the American Bar Association. Mr. Smith is a graduate of
the University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 937 (13th ed.
2001); see also Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the
Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 469, 560, n. 509 (reporting a Westlaw search finding that more than ninety Su-
preme Court decisions between 1943 and 1993 contained a substantial discussion of labor
law preemption issues).
2. See infra notes 23-40 and accompanying text. The NLRA is codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169.
3. See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
4. See Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law Pre-
emption, 13 LAB. LAW. 429, 430-34 (1998).
5. Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
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prohibits certain public employers, state grant recipients, and state
contractors from using state-provided funds or property to assist, pro-
mote, or deter union organizing efforts. 6 In response to a constitutional
challenge filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and several other
organizations, a California federal district court in Chamber of Com-
merce v. Lockyer, ruled that the NLRA preempts certain key provisions
of AB 1889. More precisely, in a terse, abbreviated opinion, the Lock-
yer court determined that AB 1889 runs afoul of both strands of NLRA
preemption and is not saved by the market participant exception to
preemption.8 In a more thorough, albeit nonexhaustive opinion, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reviewed the district court's
decision and reached a largely similar result.9 Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit held that the sections of AB 1889 at issue are "regulations"
that do not fall within the market participant exception1 ° and that AB
1889 is preempted by the Machinists strand of preemption.'1 The
appeals court did not analyze the statute under Garmon, as it con-
cluded that its Machinists analysis provided sufficient grounds to find
preemption.
The Lockyer litigation stands at the cutting edge of today's labor
law preemption jurisprudence. The decision construes both strands of
the two labor law preemption theories as well as the scope of the in-
creasingly important market participant exception to preemption. The
significance of the case is underscored by the broad array of intervenors
and amici that participated on each side of the case, including, most
notably, the National Labor Relations Board's General Counsel, who
argued in favor of both the district court's and the Ninth Circuit's pre-
emption conclusion. 12 The ultimate outcome of Lockyer, particularly if
the Supreme Court chooses to review this case, likely will provide an
important milepost in demarcating the proper boundary between fed-
eral and state interests in establishing labor policy.
This article undertakes a review and critique of the Lockyer liti-
gation. In a nutshell, the district court and the Ninth Circuit both erred
in deciding that federal labor law preempts AB 1889. Although the
California legislation constitutes regulation rather than self-interested
proprietary action, the substance of AB 1889 does not tread upon the
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16645-16649 (West 2001).
7. 225 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 170 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3185 (D.C. D. Cal. 2002).
8. Id. at 1204-06.
9. Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 364 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
10. Id. at 1161-63.
11. Id. at 1168.
12. See National Labor Relations Board, Office of the General Counsel, Labor Board
Authorizes its General Counsel to Proceed on His Recommendation to Take Position in
Ninth Circuit Case That Two Provisions of California Statute Are Preempted by NLRA
(May 29, 2003), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/press/releases/r2493.asp (last visited
June 16, 2004).
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exclusive federal enclaves carved out by either the Garmon or the Ma-
chinists strands of NLRA preemption.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part II introduces the doctrine
of federal preemption as it applies to the NLRA, outlining both the
Garmon and Machinists strands of preemption, as well as the market
participant exception to federal preemption. Part III summarizes AB
1889 as well the district court and Ninth Circuit decisions. The re-
maining three parts analyze Garmon, Machinists, and the market par-
ticipant exception as those doctrines apply to AB 1889. In particular,
Part IV concludes that AB 1889 does not qualify for the market partic-
ipant exception and therefore is subject to preemption analysis. Part V
finds that AB 1889 is not preempted under the Machinists doctrine
because it does not regulate conduct in an area that Congress intended
to be left to the free play of economic forces. Finally, Part VI applies the
Garmon strand of preemption to the Lockyer case and concludes that
Garmon does not preempt AB 1889 since California's statute does not
interfere with or frustrate the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB.
II. The NLRA and Federal Preemption
A. General Principles
A federal system of government necessarily involves a tension in
the delegation of power between state and federal governments. Under
the U.S. Constitution, this tension is principally resolved through the
Supremacy Clause, which states, "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding."13 The Supremacy Clause authorizes, but does not com-
pel, Congress to preempt state law.14 Given the permissive nature of
federal preemption, "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touch-
stone."15 Putting a state law to the test of preemption requires one to
seek out and draw upon the particular objectives of the federal statute
to further its intended purposes. In this way, the preemption doctrine
serves to invalidate state laws that would interfere with or frustrate
the objectives of the federal scheme in question.16 In general, federal
laws preempt state and local laws in three circumstances: (1) when the
federal law contains an express preemption provision; (2) when the
state or local law is in actual conflict with the federal law; or (3) when
there is no clear conflict, but Congress intended the federal law to "oc-
cupy the field."' 7
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. Id.
15. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504,97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3147(1978).
16. See Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sounds of Silence: The Lib-
ertarian Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2000).
17. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000).
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The NLRA governs labor-management relations in the private sec-
tor.'8 In enacting this statute, Congress obviously intended federal law
to occupy, at least to some degree, the field of labor-management rela-
tions.19 The NLRA, however, contains no express preemption provision,
and it is clear that "Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legis-
lative power over industrial relations given by the Commerce Clause,"20
and that courts, in general are "reluctant to infer preemption."2 Not-
withstanding this congressional silence, if a local regulation "conflicts
with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme," the courts will
determine that the state law is preempted.22
The Supreme Court, in applying these principles, has recognized
two strands of preemption under the NLRA. Through these separate,
but complementary theories, the Court seeks to harmonize overarching
federal labor policy with sometimes competing state interests.
B. The Garmon Preemption
In its landmark decision in San Diego Building Trades Council
Local 2620 v. Garmon, the Court stated that the NLRA's preemptive
orbit proscribes not just actual conflict with state law, but also state
action that attempts to regulate conduct that is arguably either pro-
tected or prohibited by the NLRA.2 3 The Court noted that when Con-
gress enacted the NLRA, it created a "complex and interrelated federal
scheme of law, remedy and administration."2 4 Given the complex and
interrelated nature of the Act, "the ultimate aim of the Garmon strand
of preemption is to produce a uniform federal law governing labor re-
lations under the auspices of a single regulatory body."
25
The goal of uniformity in the law and administration of the Act is
realized by deferring to the judgment of the Board whenever issues
arise that involve conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by
the NLRA. Indeed, although Garmon can be credited with harmonizing
and expanding the NLRA's preemptive scope, the following language
from a pre-Garmon decision demonstrates that consistent interpreta-
tion and enforcement of the Act have long been a primary goal:
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2002).
19. See Wisconsin Dept. of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475
U.S. 282, 286, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2737 (1986) (stating that "[i]t is now a commonplace
that in passing the NLRA Congress largely displaced state regulation of industrial
relations").
20. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
21. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Massa-
chusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 224, 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2649 (1993) [here-
inafter Boston Harbor].
22. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3345
(1985) (quoting Malone, 435 U.S. at 504).
23. 359 U.S. 236, 245, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2838 (1959).
24. Id. at 243.
25. See Befort, supra note 4, at 431.
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Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be
enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the par-
ties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of
its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed
a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and
hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final admin-
istrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized ad-
ministration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain
uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid those diver-
sities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures
and attitudes toward labor controversies .... 26
The core of the Garmon preemption, accordingly, lies in the goal of
preserving the Board's primary jurisdiction to interpret and administer
the NLRA.27 Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to rule that
the Garmon theory invalidates state laws that provide a remedy not
available to the Board, even when that remedy is assessed against a
wrongdoer in a way that enforces, rather than contradicts, the sub-
stance of the NLRA.2 s
A working definition of the particular conduct that the NLRA pro-
tects or prohibits is of practical importance to Garmon analysis. Section
7 of the NLRA identifies three areas of protected conduct. 29 This section
protects employees in their right to choose whether or not to (1) orga-
nize, form, join, or assist a labor union; (2) collectively bargain; and
(3) engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. 30 Because
these activities are protected under the Act, a state cannot validly adopt
regulations or assert state court jurisdiction pertaining to conduct that
arguably falls into one of the three categories. Thus, the Supreme Court
has ruled that a state court's injunction issued against peaceful pick-
eters is preempted since such conduct constitutes protected "concerted
activity."31 The Court similarly has invalidated a state licensing statute
that restricted the right of employees to freely choose their bargaining
agent, another protected section 7 right.32
The NLRA also prohibits various "unfair labor practices" commit-
ted by either employers or labor unions. With respect to employers,
section 8(a) of the NLRA generally bans conduct that interferes with
employees' rights to organize, bargain collectively, or engage in pro-
tected concerted activities.33 Section 8(b) of the NLRA also bans certain
union activities such as interfering with an employee's section 7 rights
26. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 489, 33 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2218
(1953).
27. See Befort, supra note 4, at 431.
28. See Gould, 475 U.S. at 282 (finding preempted a state law that disqualified cer-
tain NLRA violators from eligibility for state contracts).
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2002).
30. Id.
31. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2169 (1957).
32. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 16 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 734 (1945).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2002).
112 20 THE LABOR LAWYER 107 (2004)
or engaging in unlawful concerted acts such as a secondary boycott.3 4
Under Garmon, therefore, a state also is preempted from adopting reg-
ulations or asserting state court jurisdiction as to conduct that arguably
constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 8. Thus, for example,
a state court cannot assert jurisdiction over a suit to determine the
legality of union picketing aimed at pressuring an employer into en-
tering a union shop agreement since the union's conduct is arguably
prohibited under section 8(b).35
While the "arguably protected or prohibited" standard establishes
a broad preemptive sweep, the Garmon Court recognized that federal
labor preemption should not extend to matters either deeply rooted in
local feeling or of mere peripheral concern to the federal scheme.3" The
Garmon Court explained that state jurisdiction should not be ousted
with respect to compelling state interests, such as the maintenance of
domestic peace, in the absence of clearly expressed congressional di-
rection. The "compelling local interests" exception has been recog-
nized primarily with respect to picketing, violence, or other situations
involving some type of injury to the person.38
Subsection (c) of section 8 provides a different sort of safe harbor
for certain types of expression. Section 8(c) states that "[t]he expressing
of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, ...
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice ... if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of bene-
fit."39 Thus, some forms of expression, such as an employer's comments
to employees about the possible effects of unionization, made just days
prior to an election may not be prohibited even through such a com-
munication may negatively influence employee choice in the election.
4 °
C. The Machinists Preemption
A second strand of NLRA preemption was established in Lodge 76,
International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Commission.41 This strand stands for the notion that a state
34. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2002).
35. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 236.
36. Id. at 243-44.
37. Id. at 247.
38. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 94
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2759 (1977) (finding state action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress brought against union for alleged outrageous conduct not preempted); Int'l
Union, etc. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 42 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2142 (1958) (finding state regu-
lation of mass picketing and threats of violence not preempted).
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2002).
40. See DTR Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 39 F.3d 106, 110-13, 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2705
(6th Cir. 1994) (holding that employer's letter stating that companies that sole-sourced
with employer were likely to split their business in the event of unionization was pre-
diction rather than threat and, therefore, fit comfortably into 8(c)'s exception to 8(a)
violations).
41. 427 U.S. 132, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2881 (1976).
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may not regulate conduct through legislation or judicial decision, even
if the conduct is neither arguably protected nor arguably prohibited by
the Act, if it is within a zone of activity that Congress intended to be
left open to the free play of ec9nomic forces.42 If Garmon finds its theo-
retical foundation in the notion of the Board's primary jurisdiction,4 3
then the Machinists preemption finds its roots in the theory of field
occupation.4 4 At its core, the Machinists preemption protects against a
state's interference with the policies embedded in the Act itself. This
strand of preemption recognizes that important reasons exist for leav-
ing an area unregulated despite Congress' silence on the matter.45
The most cited justification for leaving an area unregulated is that
Congress intentionally left certain issues to be resolved through "the
free play of economic forces."46 As the argument goes, Congress ex-
pressly outlawed certain types of conduct within the NLRA's compre-
hensive scheme. Thus, Congress' decision to prohibit certain types of
conduct while leaving other types unregulated represents an inten-
tional balance between "the uncontrolled power of management and
labor to further their respective interests [as adverse parties in a labor
dispute]."4 7 As the Court has recognized, resort to lawful economic
weapons is "part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-
Hartley Acts have recognized."4' The Machinists strand, accordingly,
bars state and local governments from recalibrating the equilibrium
intentionally crafted by the NLRA.49 In an apparent attempt to give
more meaning to an otherwise abstract preemption test, courts tend to
supplement Machinists by stating that "[w]hether self-help economic
activities are employed by employer or union, the crucial inquiry re-
garding pre-emption is the same: whether 'the exercise of plenary state
42. Id. at 149-52.
43. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
44. See Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 209 (stating that preemption is appropri-
ate "if the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to
occupy the field to the exclusion of the States.").
45. See BEFORT, supra note 4, at 433-34.
46. See, e.g., Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S.
138, 144 (1971)).
47. See, e.g., Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252,259, 56 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2225(1964);
NLRB v. Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 498, 45 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2704 (1960); see
also Howard Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon,
72 COLUM. L. REV. 469,478 (1972) (stating that "the failure of Congress to prohibit certain
conduct warrant[s] [a] negative inference that it was deemed proper, indeed ... desirable
to be left for the free play of contending economic forces. Thus, the state is not merely
filling a gap when it outlaws what federal law fails to outlaw; it is denying one party to
an economic contest a weapon that Congress meant him to have available.").
48. Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. at 489 (holding that, while perhaps not pro-
tected by section 7, a union's directive to its bargaining unit members to engage in peace-
ful, on-the-job activities resulting in interference with their employer's business could
not be deemed per se unlawful).
49. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 619, 121
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 323 (1986).
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authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effec-
tive implementation of the Act's processes."'
5 °
Courts tend to invoke a Machinists analysis most frequently when
confronted with state laws that have an arguably regulatory effect on
the self-help economic weapons available to the parties in a labor dis-
pute. Thus, courts have invoked the Machinists preemption to strike
down regulations concerning the hiring of permanent replacement
workers,5 1 the regulation of work slowdowns,52 and a local govern-
ment's insistence that a party settle a labor dispute as a precondition
to obtaining a franchise license.53
Some regulatory statutes withstand Machinists scrutiny notwith-
standing their impact on the parties' ability to use economic weapons.
The Supreme Court, for example, has upheld several state statutes
imposing minimum labor standards, even though the statutes may
have some effect on the collective bargaining process.54 The Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld government actions establishing prevailing wage stan-
dards55 and a local government's decision to refuse to do business with
a company during the pendency of a labor dispute.5 6 Finally, the Su-
preme Court ruled that, notwithstanding the Garmon and Machinists
theories, a state's action survives preemption if the state is acting in
its capacity as a proprietor rather than as a regulator. This "market
participant" exception is examined in the following section.
D. Boston Harbor and the Market Participant Exception to
Preemption
In Building & Construction Trades Council v. Associated Builders
& Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc. (Boston Harbor),57
50. Golden State, 475 U.S. at 615 (quoting Machinists, 427 U.S. at 147-48 (quoting
R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969))).
51. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 151
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2353 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (striking down an Executive Order barring the
federal government from contracting with employers who hire permanent replacements
during a lawful strike); Employers Ass'n, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 32 F.3d 1297, 147
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2004 (8th Cir. 1994) (striking down a state law barring employers from
hiring permanent replacement workers in response to a lawful strike).
52. See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 132 (finding a state's ban on employees' concerted
refusal to work overtime preempted).
53. See Golden State Transit Corp., 475 U.S. at 608 (holding that city's act of con-
ditioning renewal of taxi cab franchise's license on the franchise's concessions in the
bargaining process preempted).
54. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2569 (1985) (concluding that a state statute requiring minimum health benefits was not
preempted); New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 100
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2896 (1979) (refusing to hold that a state statute that provided for un-
employment benefits to striking workers was preempted).
55. Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc. v. County of Sonoma, 190 F.3d 1034, 162 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2193 (9th Cir. 1999).
56. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland, 95 F.3d 1406, 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2257 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that city's refusal to purchase newspapers from corporation
amidst a labor dispute between the company and its employees not preempted).
57. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 226-28.
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the Supreme Court fashioned a rule that allows state and local govern-
ments to take certain actions that traditionally would fall within the
zones of Garmon or Machinists preemption when the government en-
tity acts in a proprietary rather than a regulatory capacity. The Boston
Harbor exception to preemption is grounded in the concept that "the
NLRA was intended to supplant state labor regulation, [but] not all
legitimate state activity that affects labor,"58 and that "[p]ermitting the
States to participate freely in the marketplace is ... consistent with
NLRA pre-emption principles."5 9 As the Court explained, if a state is
acting just as a private contractor would act, and, in doing business
with other parties, places labor conditions on those parties in a manner
that a private contractor lawfully could, then the state is not regulating
the workings of the market. Rather, the state is merely participating
in that arena in its own self-interest.60 Government action is not pre-
empted, therefore, if (1) the entity acts in a proprietary capacity and
(2) its actions, if undertaken by a private actor, would not offend the
NLRA.61
The Boston Harbor case concerned the validity of a project labor
agreement adopted by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
(MWRA). The MWRA entered into the agreement with the local Build-
ing and Construction Trades Council (BCTC) pursuant to the MWRA's
contractual obligation to construct treatment facilities that would be
used to clean up the Boston Harbor, and which MRWA would own and
manage after completion of the project.6 2 The agreement recognized the
BCTC as the exclusive bargaining agent for all craft employees working
on the project, established terms and conditions of employment, and
required all covered employees to become union members within seven
days of gaining employment.6 3 The Court held that enforcement of the
agreement was not preempted because the MWRA acted in a proprie-
tary capacity, and because its conduct, if undertaken by a private party,
would not be unlawful under the NLRA.64
The Court emphasized several attributes of the Boston Harbor fac-
tual context that led it to determine that the MWRA acted in a propri-
etary rather than a regulatory capacity. The Court noted that the state,
through the MWRA, owned and managed the property in question.6 5
The Court also found that the MWRA entered into the project labor
agreement in an attempt "to ensure an efficient project that would be
completed as quickly and effectively as possible at the lowest cost."6 6
58. Id. at 227 (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 230.
60. See id. at 233.
61. Id. at 230-33.
62. Id. at 232.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 232-33.
65. Id. at 227.
66. Id. at 232.
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And, perhaps most significantly, the MWRA's actions were "specifically
tailored to one particular job, the Boston Harbor cleanup project."6 7
Turning to the second prong of its test, the Court determined that
the MWRA acted in a way that would be lawful if undertaken by a
private actor. The Court saw the MWRA as "acting in the role of pur-
chaser of construction services."6" As the Court observed, sections 8(e)
and 8(f) of the NLRA explicitly authorize private parties to enter into
project labor agreements of the type adopted by the MWRA in Boston
Harbor.69 The Court thus concluded that the MWRA should not be re-
stricted from managing its own property pursuant to its contractual
obligations to the state "when it pursues its purely proprietary inter-
ests,"7 ° if a private party would be permitted to manage its property in
the same manner.7 1
Lower courts have struggled to apply Boston Harbor in a way that
has given much consistency to the doctrine. Whatever the source of that
inconsistency, 72 it seems clear that Boston Harbor has spawned a
hyper-technical body of case law in which subtle factual differences
carry the day. Nevertheless, a close examination of some leading cases
in this area reveals some of the critical factors courts consider when
analyzing a market participant argument.
One of the most critical factors that courts consider is whether the
government's actions are motivated by proprietary concerns or by a
desire to set labor policy. The significance of this distinction was raised
in Boston Harbor itself. There, the Court contrasted the facts of that
case with those in Wisconsin Department of Industry v. Gould Inc.,73
where the Court found preempted a state statute that disqualified po-
tential government contractors with three or more unfair labor practice
violations. While the MWRA in Boston Harbor entered into the project
67. Id.
68. Id. at 233.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e), (f) (2002).
70. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 231.
71. NLRA section 8(f) authorizes private parties in the construction industry to en-
ter into the type of prehire agreement executed by the MWRA in Boston Harbor. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(f). Prehire agreements are collective bargaining agreements providing for union
recognition, compulsory dues or equivalents, and mandatory use of union hiring halls
prior to the hiring of any employees. See PATRICK HARDEN & JOHN E. HIGGINS JR., THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 958-66 (4th ed. 2001). Subsection (f) permits a general con-
tractor's prehire agreement to require an employer not to hire other contractors perform-
ing work on that particular project site unless they agree to become bound by the terms
of that labor agreement. Id. See also Henry H. Perritt Jr., Keeping the Government Out
of the Way: Project Labor Agreements Under the Supreme Court's Boston Harbor Decision,
12 LAB. LAw. 69 (1996) (discussing Boston Harbor and project labor agreements).
72. See Roger C. Hartley, Preemption's Market Participant Immunity-A Constitu-
tional Interpretation: Implications for Living Wage and Labor Peace Policies, 5 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 229, 232 (2003) (contending that the Court's opinion does not provide
adequate guidance to lower courts since it failed to explain why states should be privi-
leged to act freely in the marketplace).
73. 475 U.S. at 291.
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labor agreement out of proprietary management concerns, the statute
in Gould was motivated by an effort to deter labor law violations.7 4
In many cases, the analysis of this dichotomy is refined into a nar-
rower set of considerations. For instance, several cases have decided
the market participant issue by looking to the scope of the state's con-
duct. If a state's conduct reflects an ad hoc decision and is tailored to
one particular project, courts usually hold that the state is acting in a
proprietary capacity.7 On the other hand, if a governmental entity
seeks to affect uniform standards of conduct in a manner that smacks
of general policy setting, it will have greater difficulty in arguing that
it acted as a market participant.76
To determine whether a state or local government is participating
in the market, courts also will scrutinize the conditions placed on a
government's award of a project or fund to an employer to shed light
on whether or not the condition seeks to affect conduct that is related
to the performance of contractual obligations to the government. In
other words, the inquiry rests on a factual finding of whether the law
is an effort by the government to contract directly with employers for
goods or services. If so, the state's actions are more proprietary in na-
ture and less likely to be preempted.
In Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford,7 7 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals fashioned many of these principles into
a two-part test. The first prong asks whether the government's action
reflects its interest in the efficient procurement of needed goods
and services as measured against a typical private party in similar
74. Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 228. Other cases also emphasize the courts' consid-
eration of the motivational source of the government's conduct. See, e.g., Dillingham, 190
F.3d at 1038 (holding the state's establishment of minimum apprenticeship standards
not to satisfy the market participant standard, in part because the state was not moti-
vated by management concerns; its purpose was to regulate apprenticeship programs
and wages paid on public works contracts).
75. See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 232 (applying market participant exception where
water authority was ordered by court to perform cleanup project in a timely manner); see
also Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 693 (5th Cir.
1999) (holding that a city was a market participant when it passed and enforced an
ordinance dealing with contract specifications for bidders who wished to perform the city's
nonconsensual towing services); Colfax v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 79 F.3d 631,
634-35 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that requirement that contractor adhere to area col-
lective bargaining agreement was not preempted by the NLRA).
76. See Dillingham, 190 F.3d 1034 (holding that the state sought to regulate, rather
than participate, in the market when it established an apprentice prevailing wage law
that was not established for a specific project); Reich, 74 F.3d at 1336-37 (invalidating
an executive order authorizing the secretary of labor to disqualify employers who hire
permanent replacement workers during a lawful strike from certain federal contracts.
Commenting on Boston Harbor, the court stated that "[s]urely, the result would have
been entirely different, ... if Massachusetts had passed a general law.., requiring all
construction contractors doing business with the state to enter into collective bargaining
agreements... containing § 8(e) pre-hire agreements."). Id. at 1337.
77. 180 F.3d at 686.
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circumstances. The second prong asks whether the narrow scope of
the challenged action defeats an inference that the primary goal of
the conduct is to encourage a general policy result rather than to ad-
dress a specific proprietary problem.78 Applying this test, the court
found that the city's action of contracting for nonconsensual towing
services was not regulatory in nature, but instead constituted a nar-
rowly focused exercise of a proprietary function, and thus was not sub-
ject to preemption.7 9
A federal district court in California expressly applied the Cardinal
Towing test in Aeroground, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco,
where the court invalidated an airport commission's rule that com-
pelled employers desiring to conduct business at the airport to abide
by a card check procedure as opposed to a Board-supervised election
for determining union representation status.80 One of the flawed as-
pects of the rule, according to the court, was that it had the effect of
controlling the conduct of many employers (such as cargo handlers) and
the conditions under which the employers could contract and deal with
third parties (most notably, private airlines).8" The court went on to
note that a very different situation would exist if the airport actually
was purchasing services from the employers upon whom it placed con-
ditions.8 2 Since the rule was aimed at third parties rather than at the
direct procurement of goods or services, the court concluded that it
resembled a licensing scheme similar to that previously found pre-
empted by the Supreme Court in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of
Los Angeles. 83
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Building
and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh,84 in con-
trast, has adopted a line of reasoning that appears to diverge from
other decisions in the Boston Harbor line of cases. InAllbaugh, several
labor organizations challenged the validity of an executive order pro-
scribing the prohibiting or requiring of project labor agreements in
federally funded construction projects.8 5 The court of appeals ruled
that Executive Order 13202 constituted proprietary action rather
than regulation, even though the order clearly constituted a "blanket,
78. Id. at 693.
79. Id. at 697.
80. 170 F. Supp. 2d 950, 168 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2135 (D.N.D. Cal. 2001).
81. Id. at 958.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 957-58 (referring to Golden State Transit Corp., 475 U.S. 608, as a
factually similar case. The Supreme Court ruled that the City of Los Angeles' action in
conditioning its renewal of a taxi company's license on the company's settlement of a
labor dispute with a third-party bargaining agent was invalid under a Machinists pre-
emption analysis.).
84. 295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
85. Id. at 30.
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across-the-board rule that 'flatly prohibit[ed]' . . . certain actions on
the part of [the government's] contractors and recipients of its finan-
cial assistance."8 6
The Allbaugh decision appears to depart from other market par-
ticipant cases in two ways. First, the court of appeals in Allbaugh em-
phasized that the conditions imposed on recipients of federal funds by
the executive order were related to the performance of the employer's
contractual obligations to the government and, hence, were proprietary
in nature even though the executive order operated as a blanket rule
rather than an ad hoc decision."7 Having reached that conclusion, the
court then went on to state that "there simply is no logical justification
for holding that if an executive order establishes a consistent practice
regarding the use of PLAs, it is regulatory even though the only deci-
sions governed by the executive order are those that the federal gov-
ernment makes as [a] market participant." 8 Second, the court asserted
that there is no legally significant difference in proprietorship analysis
when rules are imposed upon federally funded projects than when they
are placed upon federally owned projects.8 9 The court, as support for
this conclusion, maintained that because the government is the pro-
prietor of its own funds, when it acts to ensure the most effective use
of those funds, it necessarily is acting in a proprietary capacity.90
Given the recent vintage of Allbaugh, other courts have not yet
commented on the D.C. Circuit's novel reasoning. It is arguable, how-
ever, that the Allbaugh decision does not actually depart from the hold-
ing in Boston Harbor, even though the decision's reasoning and factual
application seem to depart from prior case law. As stated above, the
critical inquiry under a Boston Harbor analysis is whether the entity
acts in a proprietary capacity and whether its actions, if undertaken by
a private actor, would offend the NLRA. 91 While several courts look to
whether the government's rule applies to a specific project through an
ad hoc decision,9 2 it is arguable that the Court in Boston Harbor con-
sidered the ad hoc facet as just one factor relevant to the analysis and
not necessarily a dispositive one. Thus, even though blanket applica-
tion may weigh heavily against a finding of market participation, All-
baugh may not be a wrongly decided case. Still, given the appearance
of regulation that a blanket rule casts, it is likely that other factors
86. Id. at 35 (quoting Reich, 74 F.3d at 1337, but rejecting the holdings of Reich and
other market participant cases that uniformly applied rules that do not constitute ad
hoc decisions by the government and thus do not qualify for the market participant
exception).
87. See Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 34-36.
88. Id. at 35.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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must appear heavily oriented toward market behavior to overcome
such a critical element.
III. AB 1889 and Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer
A. AB 1889
On September 28, 2000, California enacted AB 1889 as Cal. Stats.
2000, Ch. 872, which added sections 16645 through 16649 to the Cali-
fornia Government Code. 93 The preamble of AB 1889 declares:
It is the policy of the state not to interfere with an employee's choice
about whether to join or be represented by a labor union. For this
reason, the state should not subsidize efforts by an employer to assist,
promote, or deter union organizing. It is the intent of the Legislature
in enacting this act to prohibit an employer from using state funds
and facilities for the purpose of influencing employees to support or
oppose unionization.
94
AB 1889 prohibits certain employers, state grant and program recipi-
ents, and state contractors from using state funds or property to assist,
promote, or deter union organizing.9 5 AB 1889 provides for injunctive
relief, damages, civil penalties, and other appropriate equitable relief
for violations of its provisions.9 6
More specifically, sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 apply to recipients
of state grant funds and private employers participating in a state pro-
gram in excess of $10,000 in any calendar year. These sections ex-
pressly prohibit those parties from using state funds to assist, promote,
or deter union organizing. In addition, these sections require certifi-
cation from the recipients that the funds will not be used for prohibited
purposes and require record keeping sufficient to show that no state
funds were used to defray the cost of those activities.9 7
B. Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer
In Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer,9 s a group of employer orga-
nizations and nursing homes challenged the validity of AB 1889. This
group of plaintiffs successfully convinced the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California that sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 of that
statute are preempted by the NLRA.
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 16645-16649 (West 2001).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Cal. Gov't. Code §§ 16645-16645.8 (West 2001).
97. Cal. Gov't. Code §§ 16645.2, 16645.7 (West 2001). In addition to the accounting
requirements, AB 1889 also contains clauses that provide for remedies and causes of
action. Specifically, the statute contains a provision for compensatory damages and in-
junctive and equitable relief to the state, as well as a clause that makes employers who
violate the statute liable for a civil penalty of up to twice the amount of state funds spent
toward assisting, promoting, or deterring the union campaign. Id. at §§ 16645.2(d),
16645.7(d). The statute also provides that any state taxpayer can bring a suit under its
provisions. Id. at § 16645.8.
98. 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
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The Lockyer district court's preemption analysis encompasses ap-
proximately one and one-half pages. 99 In that space, the court quickly
rolled out the relevant Garmon and Machinists preemption strands and
described the policy considerations underlying NLRA section 8(c). The
district court concluded that AB 1889 is preempted because it regulates
employer speech about union organizing even though Congress in-
tended section 8(c) to provide for an atmosphere of "free debate," and
because it found the market participant exception inapplicable.
0
While the Ninth Circuit approached the case more deliberately, it
ultimately reached a similar result. The Ninth Circuit determined that
AB 1889 represents an unlawful intrusion into an area of labor law
that Congress intended to be left unregulated, and, therefore, runs
afoul of the Machinists preemption doctrine. 1 1 The appeals court also
conducted an examination of the market participant exception and con-
cluded that AB 1889 constitutes regulation rather than proprietary
government action. 0 2 Having determined that AB 1889 is preempted
on these grounds, the Ninth Circuit did not discuss the alternative Gar-
mon basis asserted for preemption.1
0 3
A closer examination of AB 1889 in light of fundamental federal
preemption principles reveals that the NLRA does not preempt AB
1889. This examination will show that, consistent with the opinions of
both courts, California did not act in a proprietary capacity in enacting
AB 1889 and the statute is not immune from preemption analysis al-
together. As discussed below, however, neither the logic nor the policy
underlying the two NLRA preemption tests conflicts with AB 1889. The
Ninth Circuit, accordingly, should have reversed the district court's
finding of preemption. More significantly at this juncture, the Supreme
Court should accept review of this case and correct the Ninth Circuit's
error.
IV. AB 1889 and the Market Participant Exception to
Preemption
The Ninth Circuit properly applied the principles of Boston Harbor
in determining that AB 1889 is not insulated from preemption analysis
by the market participant exception. Because AB 1889 is a regulatory
rather than a proprietary act, it is subject to scrutiny under the Garmon
and Machinists strands of NLRA preemption.
The Ninth Circuit outlined the basic principles of the market par-
ticipant exception using the facts and reasoning of Boston Harbor and
99. Id. at 1204-06.
100. Id. at 1205.
101. Lockyer, 364 F.3d at 1168.
102. Id. at 1160-63.
103. Id. at 1166 n. 6.
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Gould. 1 1 4 It then noted that no general rule prevails in the Ninth Cir-
cuit for applying the exception, and instead cited several previous
Ninth Circuit decisions to illustrate the courts' treatment of the excep-
tion and to reach the conclusion that when a state uses its spending
power to shape the overall labor market in a manner that is nonpro-
prietary, the exception will not apply.105
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the two-part test established
by the Fifth Circuit in Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of
Bedford.,0 6 Consistent with the first prong of this standard, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the statute "does not purport to reflect Califor-
nia's interest in the efficient procurement of goods and services, as
measured by the similar behavior of private parties. Rather, the stat-
ute's preamble makes clear that the legislative purpose is not procure-
ment, but preventing the state from influencing employee choice about
whether to join a union."1°7 The appeals court found that AB 1889 also
failed the second prong of the Cardinal Towing test since "sections
16645.2 and 16645.7 [do not] have a narrow scope or any other ele-
ment that would indicate that the statute is unrelated to broader so-
cial regulation."1
0 8
While the Cardinal Towing test provides one plausible framework
for analyzing AB 1889 in terms of the market participant exception,
the Ninth Circuit could have reached the same result while applying
a more straightforward analysis based on existing precedent. This
analysis, as demonstrated below, also supports the conclusion that AB
1889 constitutes regulation rather than proprietary governmental
action.
Under prevailing precedent, the market participant exception ap-
plies primarily when states act for a proprietary purpose on a specific
project. ° 9 Sections 16645.2 and 16645.7, however, apply broadly to all
state grants and programs consisting of $10,000 or more. AB 1889,
additionally, does not cite unique needs associated with any particular
project. Thus, the statute is not the result of ad hoc decision making
on the part of the government to tailor its business operations to a
particular need. The blanket applicability of this statute without re-
gard to specific circumstances distinguishes AB 1889 from the labor
agreement executed in Boston Harbor. 10 In contrast, AB 1889 is simi-
104. Id. at 1161.
105. Id. at 1161-62 (citing the Ninth Circuit's decisions in the Dillingham, Ala-
meda Newspapers, and Seward cases).
106. 180 F.3d at 693. The Cardinal Towing test is discussed supra notes 77-79 and
accompanying text.
107. Lockyer, 364 F.3d at 1163.
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
110. See Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 232.
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lar to the wage standards in Dillingham,"' the card check rule in Aero-
ground,"2 the executive order in Reich,"' and the statute in Gould,"4
all of which were held not to be exempt from preemption analysis be-
cause of their broad, general applicability.
Other factors that are pertinent to a finding of market participant
status also are absent in the context of AB 1889. Because the statute
is not aimed at a single undertaking, its goal, unlike that in Boston
Harbor, is not as clearly linked to ensuring the efficient and effective
performance of a project."' Likewise, California cannot be said to own
and manage its own property in the same way that the court in Boston
Harbor perceived the MWRA to own and manage its property.116 The
property that the MWRA managed in Boston Harbor was the physical
site on which the project was to be consummated. In that way, the
MWRA acted "as if it were an ordinary general contractor, like a private
buyer of services."117 In the instant case, California is not purchasing
services from the parties it is regulating. Additionally, because the em-
ployers subject to AB 1889, not the state, behave in a manner similar
to general contractors, California cannot persuasively argue that it is
acting like a general contractor in enacting AB 1889.
It could be argued that the property that California is attempting
to manage in this instance is its purse. This reasoning resonates with
the D.C. Circuit's Allbaugh opinion. There, the court concluded that
the distinction between federally owned and federally funded projects
is irrelevant and that a "government is the proprietor of its own
funds.""' Under such a theory, a state or local governmental entity can
act as a market participant when it undertakes measures to ensure the
most effective use of its own funds even if those measures are taken
pursuant to a blanket rule as opposed to an ad hoc decision.119 The
cautionary language of the Aeroground opinion, however, undercuts
this argument and casts doubt on the legitimacy of such a broad con-
ception of the market participant doctrine:
111. See Dillingham, 190 F.3d at 1034.
112. See Aeroground, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 957-58.
113. See Reich, 74 F.3d at 1336-37. In Reich, the D.C. Circuit Court commented as
follows on the likely result under a variation of Boston Harbor's facts which look strik-
ingly similar in form to those in Lockyer: "[s]urely, the result would have been entirely
different .... if Massachusetts had passed a general law ... requiring all construction
contractors doing business with the state to enter into collective bargaining agreements
... containing § 8(e) pre-hire agreements." Id. at 1337.
114. See Gould, 425 U.S. at 286.
115. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 65, 70 and accompanying text.
117. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1336 (quoting Associated Builders & Contractors of Massa-
chusetts/Rhode Island v. Massachusetts Water Res. Auth., 935 F.2d 345, 366 (1st Cir.
1991) (en banc) (Breyer, C.J., dissenting)).
118. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d at 35. The Allbaugh decision is discussed supra at notes
84-92 and accompanying text.
119. Id. at 34-36.
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The [defendant] may have intended the rule solely as a device for
increasing the [defendant's] revenues, but simply addressing the fi-
nancial interests of a public entity does not make such efforts those
of a market participant. If that were the case, then every effort by a
government entity to increase its revenues could be characterized as
market participant. The exception to NLRA preemption established
by Boston Harbor is much narrower. 120
Although Allbaugh is not without some ground-level appeal, it stands
as an outlier in the case law, and the Ninth Circuit likely was correct
in refusing to cut across that deep grain in its review of the district
court decision in Lockyer.
For the foregoing reasons, AB 1889's purpose is aimed at setting a
general policy that is regulatory in nature. As such, the Ninth Circuit
properly concluded that AB 1889 is subject to preemption analysis.
V. AB 1889 Should Not Be Preempted Under the
Machinists Preemption Doctrine
In holding AB 1889 preempted by Machinists, the district court
stated that "AB 1889 is preempted because it regulates employer
speech about union organizing under specified circumstances, even
though Congress intended free debate."1 2 1 The Ninth Circuit's Machin-
ists analysis similarly reflects a deeply rooted concern over maintaining
an atmosphere of robust debate in the organizing process. 1 22 As dis-
cussed in more detail below, these decisions are in error because AB
1889 does not bar the free debate contemplated by section 8(c), but
simply withholds state financing for such activities.
To its credit, the Ninth Circuit did provide a more thoughtful Ma-
chinists analysis of AB 1889 than the district court, at least to the ex-
tent it discussed several aspects of that strand of preemption and
openly considered the relative merits of each party's arguments. 123 Af-
ter first establishing the basic contexts in which Machinists operates,
the appeals court proceeded to highlight the backbone of Machinists-
economic self-help' 24 -and the all-important corollary to self-help
mechanisms: free and robust debate in union campaigns.125 Continu-
ing, the court determined that AB 1889, by addressing employer actions
that assist, promote, or deter union organizing, targets a process nec-
essary to the functioning of the overall process under the Act. 1 26
120. Aeroground, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 958.
121. Lockyer, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
122. See Lockyer, 364 F.3d at 1165 (discussing the development of an extensive ju-
risprudence "emphasizing that open and robust advocacy by both employers and em-
ployees must exist in order for the NLRA collective bargaining process to succeed").
123. Id. at 1164-68.
124. Id. at 1164.
125. Id. at 1165.
126. Id. at 1166.
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The court described state regulation as falling into one of two cate-
gories for purposes of the Machinists preemption: (1) that which only
incidentally affects the organizing process and (2) that which directly
targets a process central to union organizing. 127 According to the court,
state laws of general applicability, such as those imposing minimum
labor standards that are not directed toward altering the bargaining
positions of employers or unions but that may have an indirect effect
on relative bargaining strength, are not preempted under Machin-
ists.12s On the other hand, laws that directly target the processes of
union organizing or collective bargaining, such as the regulations at
issue in Golden State and Gould, are subject to the Machinists pre-
emption.129 According to the Ninth Circuit, state regulation that "di-
rectly targets and substantially affects open employer discussion about
unionization" is preempted, regardless of the form or method of such
state regulation.
130
AB 1889, according to the appeals court, falls into the impermis-
sible category of direct and substantial state regulation. In support of
this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found that AB 1889 has the explicit
purpose of interfering with the NLRA's system for union organizing. 
131
Additionally, the court stated that the statute's restriction on the ex-
penditure of state funds, the accounting requirements, and the creation
of a private right of action and damage provisions have the actual effect
of directly interfering with the organizing process. 132 In sum, the court
found that the statute "both substantially and purposefully alters the
balance of forces in the union organizing process, interfering directly
with a process protected by the NLRA." 133 Based on this conclusion, the
court held the statute preempted by federal law.
The flaw in the Ninth Circuit's analysis is not in its delineation of
the respective categories of state regulation, but in its placement of
AB 1889 in the category of an impermissible "direct and substantial"
regulation. AB 1889 does not directly preclude the free debate of any
party to a union organizing campaign. The statute does not bar any
form of expression, but only restricts the use of state funds as a means
127. Id. (citing Machinists as Supreme Court precedent in support of this proposi-
tion).
128. Id. (citing Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Machinists for the notion that
"[the Machinists doctrine] does not ... preclude the States from enforcing, in the context
of a labor dispute, 'neutral' state statutes or rules of decision: state laws that are not
directed toward altering the bargaining positions of employers or unions but which may
have an indirect effect on relative bargaining strength"). Such state laws are discussed
supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 1167.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1168.
132. Id. (noting that "an employer who decides against neutrality will incur both
compliance costs and litigation risk").
133. Id.
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of financing such activities. By withholding a state subsidy to employ-
ers engaged in either a pro-union or antiunion campaign, the statute
levels the playing field in a neutral manner by ensuring that the state
is not financing the activities of either party to such a campaign. Al-
though this restriction may have a slight effect on the organizing pro-
cess for a few employers for whom state financing makes up a consid-
erable portion of their overall budget, 13 4 the imposition of conditions on
the voluntary receipt of government funds is a well-recognized means
of safeguarding the expenditures of public funds for public purposes. 135
In a nutshell, AB 1889 neither directly nor substantially regulates the
union organizing process.
More expansively, as discussed below, the Ninth Circuit's holding
is incorrect for three reasons: (1) the decision falsely assumed that the
Machinists doctrine requires the state to subsidize employer speech in
a union campaign and, thus, incorrectly equated the state's refusal to
subsidize with an unlawful tipping of the scales in favor of unions; (2)
AB 1889 in no way prohibits any expression insulated by section 8(c)
and employers may engage in such conduct without any impediment
other than using state funds to finance its activities; and (3) the decision
fails to fully recognize the fact that California's regulatory restrictions
on state fund expenditures are legitimate exercises of a government's
authority over its own fisc.
Union organizing campaigns often consist of heated battles be-
tween employers and bargaining representatives. Embellishments,
harsh words, and extreme charges commonly characterize the atmo-
sphere prior to a Board representation election.' 3 6 Rather than policing
or censoring this propaganda, the Board and courts recognize that the
liberty to speak for a specific cause in the organizational context goes
to the heart of the contest over whether an employee chooses to be
represented or not. 137 Because it is the employee's ultimate decision as
to which position to support, the Court has decided that the employee
should make an educated choice after sifting through the free flow of
information.138
134. Such a budgetary status, of course, results from the voluntary choices of indi-
vidual employers rather than by any mandate of AB 1889.
135. See infra notes 146-72 and accompanying text.
136. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58, 61
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2345 (1966) (stating that "[bloth labor and management often speak
bluntly and recklessly, embellishing their respective positions with imprecatory lan-
guage'); see also Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 372, 410 (2002).
137. See, e.g., NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 760, 66 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2707 (9th Cir. 1967).
138. See Linn, 383 U.S. at 60 (stating that the NLRB "leaves to the good sense of
the voters the appraisal of such matters, and to opposing parties the task of correcting
inaccurate and untruthful statements).
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AB 1889, through its prohibition on using state grant and program
funds to promote or deter union organizing, 139 does not preclude an
employer from engaging in antiunion campaigns. An employer can still
fully engage in such a campaign. Nor does the statute penalize or pro-
hibit an employer's efforts to either promote or deter a union's cam-
paign. Rather, the entire regulatory character of the statute takes the
form of avoiding the subsidization of an employer's efforts to assist,
promote, or deter union organizing. AB 1889 merely forbids the use of
state money to finance an employer's antiunion campaign. Thus, Lock-
yer is unlike Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 140 where
the Supreme Court invoked the Machinists preemption to strike down
a city's act of conditioning the renewal of a taxi cab franchise license
on the franchise's conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement with
a striking union. Here, the governmental action does not compel a party
to change prior behavior or make forced concessions to an adversary.
The Ninth Circuit is in agreement with this distinction, as it stated
that
[AB 1889] is arguably not restricting self-help by private parties but
merely the degree to which state money is used to fund such self-help.
Because the California statute regulates no more than the uses to
which California's own funds are put, rather than imposing a collateral
penalty on additional private behavior not funded by the State, the Su-
preme Court cases that have found State exercises of the spending
power preempted by the NLRA are not directly controlling.141
AB 1889 simply maintains a policy of strict neutrality and noninter-
ference that does not impede free-flowing partisan speech.
In refusing to subsidize an employer's union stance, the California
legislature recognized that the realities of collective bargaining dictate
that local government lacks the authority to define an ideally balanced
bargaining paradigm or to introduce a standard of properly balanced
bargaining power.142 The legislation at issue is nothing more than an
attempt to avoid the appearance of improper meddling into the parties'
relative bargaining power that would likely result when an employer's
balance sheet traces its expenditures targeted toward a union cam-
paign back to the state. By refusing to risk that its funds might be used
to favor one side over another in a campaign, AB 1889 also attempts to
avoid impermissibly "tipping the scales" in favor of one party or another
in an organizing campaign. Refusing to subsidize is not the symbolic
"thumb on the scale" that one might perceive AB 1889 to be at first
glance. Although employers may see the state's withholding of support
as a thumb on the scale in support of unionization, a more accurate
139. Cal. Gov't. Code, §§ 16645-16649 (West 2001).
140. 475 U.S. at 608.
141. Lockyer, 364 F.3d at 1164-65.
142. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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view of AB 1889 is that the statute discontinues California's past prac-
tice of tipping the scales in favor of employers who were permitted to
use the state's money to further their own antiunion organizing activ-
ities. Reestablishing neutrality in this context necessarily involves
withdrawing the support previously given to employers.
As stated above, one of the crucial inquiries regarding preemption
is "whether 'the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely
prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the
Act's processes."'143 A practical approach to looking into market reali-
ties and a straightforward reading of the term "self-help" reveals that
AB 1889 simply does not curtail or prohibit an employer's use of self-
help mechanisms.
It is crucial to recognize that AB 1889 bars no conduct and speaks
only to the use of state funds. Under AB 1889, employers can fully and
zealously oppose unions in the same manner as prior to the law's en-
actment. Free debate is no way limited. Employers, moreover, may fi-
nance union-free activities from any conceivable source other than the
state.
Even if a few employers may not have sufficient resources to fi-
nance an antiunion campaign internally and find it difficult to obtain
outside funding for such activities, the Machinists preemption deals
with leaving unregulated the self-help mechanisms available to em-
ployers and unions. The term "self-help" connotes individual strength
and support, not the unbridled deployment of economic weapons ob-
tained from outside sources. 144 Similarly, the plain meaning of "self-
help" requires neither a state subsidy nor a different set of rules for
those with less economic clout.'4 5 Because AB 1889 does not curtail or
prohibit the self-help mechanisms made available to employers and
unions under the NLRA, the California statute does not frustrate ef-
fective implementation of the Act's processes.
Finally, California's restrictions on state fund expenditures in AB
1889 should be upheld from the Machinists preemption as a legitimate
exercise of authority over its own fisc.
Government and private grantors commonly place conditions on
the recipients of funds, such as by prohibiting the recipient from using
143. Golden State Transit Corp., 475 U.S. at 615 (quoting Machinists, 427 U.S. at
147-48 (quoting R.R. Tainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. at 380 )); see also
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
144. See Hartley, supra note 72, at 249 (stating, "Congress did not intend that union
representation decisions should be left to the uncontrolled exercise of either party's rela-
tive economic might. To the contrary, the Act favors unencumbered employee free
choice.").
145. See generally Atlas Metal Parts Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 304, 309, 108 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2474 (7th Cir. 1981) (ruling that a party does not commit an unfair labor practice
when it is able to insist on a favorable bargaining outcome owing to its superior economic
strength).
A Critique of Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer
such funds for certain proscribed purposes. As one of many examples,
the Supreme Court, in Harris v. McRae,'4 6 upheld the Hyde Amend-
ment that limited reimbursement of Medicaid abortion costs, reasoning
that "refusal to subsidize" certain conduct "cannot be equated with the
imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity."1 47
The Supreme Court similarly upheld restrictions on the use of gov-
ernment funds in Rust v. Sullivan, 4 8 where recipients of family plan-
ning funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act were pre-
cluded from using federal funds in programs in which abortion was a
method of family planning.' 49 In upholding the restrictions, the Court
noted that Congress had "not denied [the fund recipients] the right to
engage in abortion-related activities. Congress has merely refused to
fund such activities out of the public fisc .... "0o The Court explained
that while a ban of the former sort might violate the First Amendment
under the "unconstitutional conditions" line of cases, the latter restric-
tion is permissible since the government is allowed more latitude in
directing the expenditure of its own funds.1 5 ' Rust relied on the Court's
earlier decision in Maher v. Roe,'52 in which the Court similarly rea-
soned that, because a state has a strong and legitimate interest in en-
couraging normal childbirth, a state's decision to subsidize childbirth
but not certain abortions is both rational and valid.
Similar to the government's legitimate public interest in Rust, AB
1889 also represents a fiscal measure tailored to the preservation of a
state's legitimate interests. Here, California possesses a legitimate in-
terest in remaining neutral in organizing campaigns, thereby avoiding
the perception that it is aiding one side over another and enabling em-
ployee choice in an atmosphere free of government intrusion. California
also has a legitimate interest in ensuring that its funds, if accepted,
are used for appropriate public purposes. In the enactment of AB 1889,
California has made the judgment that while partisan employer speech
may further the goal of robust debate in a union organizing campaign,
speech that is subsidized by public funds on one side of the debate but
not on the other does not further this goal and is not an appropriate
use of its purse. California should not be required to subsidize employer
speech in union campaigns at the expense of its legitimate local inter-
ests, and a refusal to do so cannot be equated with the imposition of a
penalty on employer speech.
146. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
147. See id. at 317 n.19.
148. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
149. Id. at 178.
150. Id. at 198.
151. Id. at 197.
152. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See also Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 369 (upholding the
federal government's refusal to subsidize an employee's right of free expression on union
matters by disqualifying striking workers from eligibility for food stamps).
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While the Ninth Circuit recognized the analogy between cases such
as Rust and AB 1889's refusal to subsidize employer speech in orga-
nizing campaigns,15 3 it ultimately concluded that "First Amendment
concepts cannot be imported wholesale in construing the NLRA for the
purpose of preemption analysis," '154 and that the constitutional analysis
utilized in the Rust line of decisions was "inapposite" in the case of AB
1889.155 The Ninth Circuit offered two explanations for this conclusion.
The court first noted that the Rust line of cases provide only a manner
of reasoning in an analogous context rather than a controlling principle
of law.15 In this regard, the court stated that "[u]se of constitutional
doctrine in this area is solely by analogy and we must determine
whether [this] analogy to the First Amendment is apt."157 The appeals
court additionally noted that the scope of protected speech under the
NLRA is not coextensive with the usual scope of protected First Amend-
ment speech in a nonworkplace setting.'5 8 In particular, the court noted
that speech rights may be subject to more regulation in the workplace
setting in order "to protect substantial rights of employees or to pre-
serve harmonious labor relations in the public interest."'5 9
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in rejecting the logic of Rust and
similar cases is not convincing. First of all, the analogy to Rust is very
"apt." In both contexts, to paraphrase Rust, a governmental entity has
not denied fund recipients the right to engage in certain activities but
has merely refused to fund such activities out of the public fisc.160 When
such an "apt" analogy to a constitutional standard has been demon-
strated, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to embrace that standard
as an appropriate line of demarcation for preemption analysis. In Linn
v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114, the Supreme
Court borrowed constitutional law principles established in the context
of defamation jurisprudence in ruling that the NLRA does not preempt
state law defamation claims where a claimant can establish that de-
famatory statements were made with malice and caused actual dam-
age.16 ' In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
The standards enunciated in New York 7mes v. Sullivan [citations
omitted] are adopted by analogy, rather than by constitutional com-
pulsion. We apply the malice test to effectuate the statutory design
with respect to pre-emption.' 62
153. Lockyer, 364 F.3d at 1169-70.
154. Id. at 1170.
155. Id. at 1171.
156. Id. at 1170.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing to NLRB v. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 633 F.3d 766, 772 n.9
(9th Cir. 1980).
160. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198.
161. 383 U.S. at 64-65.
162. Id. at 65.
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The lack of congruency between usual First Amendment standards
relating to speech and those standards regulating speech in the labor
relations context also does not serve the Ninth Circuit's conclusion. For
one thing, the fact that a number of cases construe speech rights more
narrowly in the workplace than in other settings hardly justifies the
more expansive construction of workplace speech rights under section
8(c) as adopted by the Ninth Circuit. 163 Moreover, this lack of congru-
ence underscores the fact that whatever "rights" flow from section
8(c),164 they necessarily are less weighty than those flowing from the
First Amendment. If the analogy utilized in Rust and Linn is operative
in the context of constitutional-based rights, it is difficult to conceive
why an otherwise apt analogy is "inapposite" in the context of the more
modest safe harbor of section 8(c).
The relative weight of section 8(c) also is diminished by the fact
that several federal statutes contain restrictions similar to AB 1889
in terms of prohibiting the use of federal program funds to assist,
promote, or deter union organizing. 165 In fact, the Ninth Circuit con-
ceded that there is force to the argument that these federal restric-
tions, several of which track language identical to that used in the
California statute, evidence the legitimacy of AB 1889's similar fund-
ing restriction.
1 6 6
The Ninth Circuit nonetheless found that these federal statutes
provide a "too ambiguous" basis for inferring congressional intent to
permit California's regulation to stand.167 Specifically, the court noted
that the analogous federal statutes target only recipients of certain
specific funds, while AB 1889 applies to all recipients of state funds in
excess of $10,000.168
163. See Lockyer, 364 F.3d at 1170.
164. As discussed infra at notes 180-83 and accompanying text, section 8(c) does
not create any protected rights, but merely insulates certain types of expression from
being deemed an unfair labor practice.
165. See Lockyer, 364 F.3d at 1171. The statutes urged by the defendants included:
29 U.S.C. § 2931(b)(7), stating that "[elach recipient of funds under [the Workforce In-
vestment Act] shall provide to the Secretary assurances that none of such funds will be
used to assist, promote, or deter union organizing"; 42 U.S.C. § 9839(e), stating that
"[flunds appropriated to carry out [the Head Start Programs Act] shall not be used to
assist, promote, or deter union organizing; and 42 U.S.C. § 12634(b)(1), stating that
"[a]ssistance provided under [the National Community Service Act] shall not be used by
program participants and program staff to assist, promote, or deter union organizing."
Lockyer, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2931(b)(7) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 9839(e),
12634(b)(1)).
166. Lockyer, 364 F.3d at 1171 (going so far as to say that "[h]ad Congress imposed
a federal version of sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 with directly analogous spending re-
strictions on all federal government grants or expenditure, that would weigh significantly
against finding preemption here").
167. Id. at 1171-72.
168. Id. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the analogous federal statutes do not
contain the same remedial provisions as AB 1889. Id.
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The import of these federal statutes, however, is far from ambig-
uous. As the essence of preemption analysis is to ascertain the intent
of Congress,' 6 9 the fact that Congress has enacted a series of funding
restrictions substantially similar to AB 1889 provides powerful evi-
dence that Congress does not construe section 8(c) as establishing such
an overarching principle of labor-management relations that would
preclude reasonable restrictions on governmental funding of union or-
ganizing campaigns. Since Congress repeatedly has demonstrated that
such funding restrictions can coexist with section 8(c), presumably it
also intends that the NLRA not preempt state statutes that operate in
a similar fashion.
Perhaps the appeals court is intimating that state funding restric-
tions do not stand on par with federal funding restrictions.1 70 Such a
view, however, would be erroneous. Congress, of course, does have the
authority under the Commerce Clause to amend the NLRA either di-
rectly or by writing exemptions into other laws. 171 But the authority
of governmental entities to impose restrictions on the use of their funds
does not flow from any unique federal constitutional font. This power,
instead, inheres from the basic constitutional authority of govern-
mental entities to regulate the use of their own funds. Absent some
special federal restriction, this authority belongs to the states just as
it does to the federal government. And, similar to the federal govern-
ment, states have a legitimate interest in conserving the public fisc to
enable states and local units to provide essential public services. In
sum, the rationale for the Machinists preemption provides no basis to
distinguish between federal and state funding restrictions unless the
state funding restriction alters the balance of economic forces given free
reign by the NLRA.
The court's emphasis on the difference in scope of applicability be-
tween the federal statutes and AB 1889 as evidence of preemption also
is quite curious, as this characteristic would seem influential only un-
der a market participant analysis. Under existing Machinists jurispru-
dence, the number of employees affected by a state statute ordinarily
would not appear to be a relevant factor.172
Ultimately, California employers are under no compulsion to seek
state contracts or grants. If they voluntarily choose to do so, the at-
tachment of a reasonable spending restriction that bars no employer
conduct and only limits the use of state funds to finance one side of an
organizing campaign is not inconsistent with the Machinists doctrine.
169. Malone, 435 U.S. at 504.
170. While the Ninth Circuit does not explicitly make this argument, the district
court opinion did adopt such a distinction. See Lockyer, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1205-06.
171. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (Supremacy Clause).
172. See supra notes 41-56 and accompanying text (discussing applicable principles
of Machinists preemption).
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VI. AB 1889 Should Not Be Preempted Under the Garmon
Preemption Doctrine
Because the Ninth Circuit found the Machinists doctrine to pre-
empt AB 1889, it did not reach the question of whether AB 1889 is
preempted under Garmon. '7 3 Nonetheless, given this article's opinion
that AB 1889 is not preempted under Machinists and that the Ninth
Circuit wrongly decided that issue, a look into Garmon's effect on AB
1889 is proper, as state regulations must pass muster under both doc-
trines in order to survive preemption analysis.
As noted above, the Garmon test preempts state or local laws only
to the extent that they interfere with conduct arguably protected by
section 7 or arguably prohibited by section 8.1" The purpose of this
test is to preserve the Board's primary jurisdiction to administer the
NLRA. 1
75
The district court determined that AB 1889 is preempted under
Garmon because it prevents the free debate envisioned by section 8(c)
of the NLRA. 176 Applying a more rigorous Garmon analysis, however,
California's statute should not fall to preemption because it does none
of the following: First, AB 1889 does not restrict the exercise of section
7 rights. Second, it does not regulate activities that arguably constitute
an unfair labor practice under section 8. Finally, in terms of the Board's
primary jurisdiction, AB 1889 neither provides an alternative forum
for deciding unfair labor practice issues nor imposes an additional re-
medial scheme in a way that undermines the Board's authority to ad-
minister the NLRA.
California's refusal to subsidize partisan employer speech does not
interfere with any rights protected by section 7. First of all, it is im-
portant to recognize that section 7 confers rights only on employees. 1
77
Thus, to the extent that AB 1889 places some limitation on the manner
in which employers can use state funds, that restriction by definition
cannot violate any employer section 7 rights. The California statute also
does not interfere with any employee section 7 rights. In particular, AB
1889 does not restrict an employee's right to support or oppose union
173. Lockyer, 364 F.3d at 1166 n.6 (stating "we do not decide here whether such open
debate on unionization is an affirmative right that the NLRA itself 'protects,' which
would be necessary predicates for a finding of Garmon preemption").
174. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
176. Lockyer, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-05.
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2002); see also Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor
Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE L.J. 355,379 (1990) ("Sec-
tion 7 protects only conduct of employees, not employers. Indeed, the Act nowhere vests
employers with protected rights; on its face, it forbids certain employer action, but pro-
tects none."); Hartley, supra note 72, at 248 (stating that "Garmon's protected/arguably
protected wing is ill-suited as a preemption theory [in the context of an AB 1889-type
policy] because that wing of Garmon addresses interference with section 7 rights and
employers do not have section 7-protected rights").
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organization activities. Even derivatively, the statute does not preclude
or frustrate the free flow of information that theoretically leads to em-
ployees exercising their section 7 rights through an informed choice
regarding representation. As discussed above,1 78 AB 1889 does not limit
the right of any party to say or do anything in the context of union
organizing. It only withholds state funds from subsidizing certain em-
ployer activities, but employers are nonetheless free to undertake those
same activities with their own funds. AB 1889, quite simply, does not
reach activities protected under section 7.
The district court in Lockyer justified its Garmon preemption hold-
ing by stating that AB 1889 interferes with the free debate on labor
issues that is contemplated by section 8(c).17 9 To argue that AB 1889
interferes A la Garmon necessarily assumes that section 8(c) protects
such speech. Employer speech referenced by section 8(c), however, is
not protected speech. Section 8(c), by its plain language, does nothing
more than bring noncoercive speech out of the ambit of conduct consti-
tuting an unfair labor practice.1 80 Congress, by including subsection (c)
within the section dealing with unfair labor practices, demonstrated its
intent to provide an exception to employer speech that otherwise would
be prohibited by the Act. Carving out an exception to prohibited conduct
is not the same as creating a category of protected conduct.18 1 If that
had been Congress' intent, then the current section 8(c) language likely
would have been enacted as a new section 7(b) instead. The Ninth Circuit
itself recognized this distinction in Hotel Employees, Local 2 v. Marriott
Corp.,182 where it stated, in upholding an employer's agreement to
remain silent during a union organizing campaign, that section 8(c)
... merely states an employer does not commit an unfair labor prac-
tice by expressing its views regarding unionization. This provision
does not suggest an employer's agreement not to express its views
are [sic] unenforceable.18 3
Indeed, the absence of any case law preempting state laws on the
ground that they limit protected employer speech under section 8(c)
supports the inference that the courts do not view 8(c) as affirmatively
protecting noncoercive employer speech. Thus, section 8(c) does not
178. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
179. See Lockyer, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-05.
180. Section 8(c) states that "[t]he expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof,.. . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor prac-
tice ... if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
181. The Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that the protected and prohibited con-
duct categories are not mirror images of one another. See Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 361
U.S. at 477 (holding that while a work slowdown is not protected by section 7, it is not
per se prohibited by the NLRA).
182. 961 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1992).
183. Id. at 1470 n. 9.
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give rise to a protected right that can trigger Garmon's test for federal
preemption.
AB 1889 similarly does not regulate any conduct that constitutes
an arguable unfair labor practice. The statute only addresses the use
of state funds to finance otherwise lawful employer acts.i"4 The district
court opinion apparently concedes this point as it does not make any
claim that AB 1889 runs afoul of this wing of the Garmon test.8 5
AB 1889, additionally, does nothing to deprive the Board of primary
jurisdiction to determine if activities are arguably prohibited under the
NLRA. AB 1889 will not cause California courts to adjudicate unfair
labor practice issues under section 8. The California statute will require
state courts to determine only if state funds were used in partisan em-
ployer speech, not whether such speech was lawful or nonlawful. "6 The
two statutes prohibit different conduct, and the dispositive question
under AB 1889 is decided independently of any reference to or analysis
of sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.
The Supreme Court's decision in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County District Council of Carpenters is instructive on this issue.'8 7
There, the Court stated that, when conduct that is unlawful under state
law may also be viewed as arguably prohibited under the NLRA, pre-
emption is required only to the extent that "the two potentially conflict-
ing statutes were 'brought to bear on precisely the same conduct.""8 8
Just as in Sears, '8 9the two potentially conflicting statutes in the instant
case prohibit different conduct, and preemption is not required. 190
Finally, AB 1889 survives preemption under Garmon because the
statute does not frustrate the NLRA's objective of having the Board
solely administer a uniform scheme for remedying violations of the
NLRA. 19 1 While AB 1889 does subject employers to a penalty for vio-
lating its terms, it does not punish employers for violating the NLRA. 1
92
On this basis, AB 1889 is distinguishable from the statute invalidated
184. AB 1889 prohibits covered recipients of state funds from using those funds to
assist, promote, or deter union organizing. CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 16645-16649 (West
2001). Any interpretation of the statute that would extend to barring activities prohibited
as unfair labor practices by NLRA § 8(a) clearly would be preempted by Garmon. See
supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
185. See generally Lockyer 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-05 (finding AB 1889 preempted
without invoking the "arguably protected" wing of the Garmon analysis).
186. See CAL. GovT. CODE §§ 16645-16649 (West 2001).
187. 436 U.S. 180, 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2282 (1978).
188. Id. at 193-94.
189. In Sears, the action in state court was brought to determine the lawfulness of
certain union activity under the state's trespass law, while the same conduct could have
been held to violate certain provisions of section 8 dealing with union unfair labor prac-
tices. See id. at 187-94.
190. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
191. See CAL. GovT. CODE §§ 16645-16645.8 (West 2001).
192. Gould, 475 U.S. at 282. The Gould decision is discussed supra at notes 73-74
and accompanying text.
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in Wisconsin Department of Industry v. Gould.193 In that case, by en-
acting a statute barring certain past NLRA violators from entering into
contracts with the state, Wisconsin was attempting to punish employ-
ers for the same conduct that the Board had found to be in violation of
the NLRA.19 4 The Supreme Court invalidated Wisconsin's law because
it attempted to enforce the NLRA, a responsibility with which the
Board is exclusively vested. In contrast, AB 1889 imposes its own re-
medial scheme based on conduct that is not protected or prohibited by
the NLRA. Thus, the statute neither attempts to enforce the NLRA
through additional punishment for the same violation nor punishes
employers for conduct that the NLRA would protect. AB 1889, there-
fore, does not intrude upon the Board's primary jurisdiction to admin-
ister the remedial scheme set forth in the NLRA and is not preempted
under Garmon.
VII. Conclusion
The Lockyer litigation stands at the cutting edge of NLRA preemp-
tion jurisprudence. Its focus of scrutiny, AB 1889, calls into question
the reach of both the Garmon and Machinists strands of labor law pre-
emption as well as the increasingly important, yet unsettled, market
participant exception. The Ninth Circuit should have seized this op-
portunity for "litigating elucidation" to add policy-driven clarity to the
frontier of NLRA preemption analysis. For the reasons stated above,
we believe that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly decided Chamber of Com-
merce v. Lockyer. Because AB 1889 imposes a blanket rule with respect
to state-funded union avoidance activities, the statute acts as a form of
regulation that likely does not qualify for Boston Harbor's market par-
ticipant exception to preemption. Nonetheless, the California statute
does not violate the core principles and purposes of either the Garmon
or Machinists doctrines. Since AB 1889 neither intrudes upon the
Board's primary jurisdiction to administer the NLRA nor interferes
with the free play of economic forces in areas that Congress meant to
leave unregulated, the legislation should have been sustained. Hope-
fully, the Supreme Court will exercise the opportunity to correct this
mistake.
193. See id. at 288-89.
194. Id. at 287-89.
